Afghanistan Should Also Try and Earn Our Trust

David Ignatius in his Washington Post piece today (Sunday, October 4, 2009) described similarities in the strategy pursued by the Pakistani military during their successful offensive against the Taliban in Swat Valley and the one being laid out by Gen. McChrystal . . . except on matter of trust:

"McChrystal's strategy echoes some of the Pakistani precepts -- more troops, more focus on the population, more security. But even with an additional 40,000 troops, the United States won't have the same popular support the Pakistanis enjoyed in Swat. America is fighting what many Afghans will always regard as a war of occupation. People aren't going to "fall in love" with U.S. troops."

And then he adds:

"The right Afghanistan policy begins with a frank admission that this isn't America's problem, it's Afghanistan's. The United States needs to patiently support the emerging Afghan government, keeping our troop levels firm and reliable, until the Afghans acquire the tools and political consensus to secure their country."

If the population-centric approach of Gen. McChrystal revolves around winning the trust and confidence of the local population, it should work both ways. We have the right to ask whether the people of Afghanistan are deserving of that effort. For if the local population remains tainted (with some of them exhibiting allegiances and loyalties for the enemy), coopting them through this strategy will yield little success. The only way we can trust them is if they prove to us that they are capable of using those tools against the enemy.