One of the more interesting photos that came out of the Copenhagen world summit was a photo of Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, embracing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, for the world -- well, the US, specifically -- to take note that this blossoming relationship is turning into an alliance to be reckoned with.
This is curious at best. What about their ideological dogmatism that sets them apart? On one hand, the socialism espoused by Chavez is premised on a materialist philosophy that frames world events into a dialectical conflict of economic interests and disregards religion as an opiate of the masses. On the other, Ahmadinejad’s Islamic Republic of Iran is grounded on politico-religious foundations, aimed at achieving a state of other-worldliness not only for Iran but for the rest of the world. Ahmadinejad is one of the Muslim world’s leaders who believes that the apocalypse is about to come through the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam.
But it seems such ideological differences do not deter them from embracing each other’s cause.
We’ll take their self-proclaimed piety at face value, since what they are espousing is indefensible, anyway. We’re astute enough, though, to note that what they have is nothing but philosophical adventurism and opportunism, finding commonalities in two things: 1) an understanding that populist politics is what propels tyrants to power; and, 2) that they have found a common enemy in the United States.
Populist politics is a politics of privilege and connections achieved by playing to the crowd. In its political form, it entails winning elections on the strength of a candidate’s charismatic appeal, social standing, and ability to get votes. Once in office, populist politicians set the tone for their agenda. They begin to assume the role of paternal rulers and treat their voters as children to be patronized rather than as constituents to be heard. They speak on behalf of the people for they view the people as too ignorant, impoverished, and undignified to partake in the complicated task of policy-making. Populist politicians have a total disregard for the workings of institutions. They think that they are over and above the reach of institutional checks provided by law.
In its economic form, populism manifests itself in economic decisions that rely on government intervention for solutions. Using a statist approach, a populist government determines which popular economic policies can gain support for itself.
Both Chavez and Ahmadinejad engage in this form of politics. But they get away with it because they have found a scapegoat in the United States upon which to put all the blame, all the ills plaguing their societies. Using the narrative of imperialism, they argue that the division of the world today between rich and poor countries is attributed to a large-scale exploitation by the former over the latter, with the United States as the greatest exploiters of them all. What Chavez said in Copenhagen affirms this: the world is “not democratic, it is not inclusive, but isn’t that the reality of our world, the world is really an imperial dictatorship…down with imperial dictatorships,” for which he got a standing ovation.
P.T Bauer has offered ample evidence debunking the theory of imperialism. Regardless of this evidence – that what cause poverty in many poor ccountries are endemic graft and corruption, ethnic wars, lack of capacities and institutions favorable to material progress, as well as certain cultural values and religious beliefs that do not give high value on material achievements – populist tyrants lie to their people. Instead of making their country move forward by inviting outside capital and harnessing the initiative, creativity, enthusiasm, industry, and diligence of their people, these leaders make them weak and dependent, depriving them of the very opportunities that will enable them to achieve a life of dignity and well-being.
Regardless of their ideological differences, socialists and radical Muslims seem to have found common cause in their self-righteous indignation against America.
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Saturday, December 12, 2009
'Americans as Occupiers'
While our military generals prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are clear in providing us with a rationale behind these wars, namely, to destroy al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist Islamist groups that pose a threat to both national and global security interests, many in the Muslim world, including home-grown terrorists, do not see things that way. They view the Americans as “occupiers.” According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, a nuclear physicist and defense analyst in Islamabad, “’The U.S. is seen as an occupier in Afghanistan, and there's no way that can be turned around.’ He said that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be ‘terrible for Pakistan,’ but that the United States had created the problem and must ‘clean up the mess before it leaves’” (Washington Post, “Pakistanis voice concerns about Obama's new Afghanistan plan”).
Let’s dignify this charge for a moment and take it seriously. What does it mean to be an occupier? What does empire-building entail for both the colonizer and the colonized?
The history of the world is a history of the rise and fall of empires. That’s just how it is. Most recent to date were the British imperial rule in South Asia, America’s colonial rule in the Philippines , the spread of Nazi totalitarian rule across Europe, and the expansion of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, among others. There were good and bad empires. But what makes an empire civilizing, according to Churchill, is when it promotes the interests and welfare of the colonized, hence, “a cure to the disease of tyrannical rule” (Churchill, Liberalism and the Social Problem, 156).
What makes it unjust? An empire is unjust, Churchill says, if it does not help in elevating the uncivilized world from barbarism and savagery towards a life of dignity and well-being. In defending the British Empire, he says that empire-building should not rest only on altruism, nor does it have to be motivated only by self-seeking, narrow interests: "To be just, empire must be grounded on a higher sentiment and principle, but that higher motivation must reside midway between extreme formulas.” This higher motivation lies in an imperial people's desire to improve themselves, for sharing the benefits of civilization with those who do not possess them can make an imperial people more human. In Churchill's view, "Ruling its empire justly further civilizes an imperial nation. At its best, empire is not a burden to be endured but an opportunity for individual and national self-improvement" (Kirk Emmert, Winston S. Churchill on Empire, 53).
Can a democratic nation engage in empire-building? According to Emmert,
Democratic empire would seem to rest on an alliance between two quite different views of justice and the political good. The democratic view looks to equality grounded in a commonly shared humanity, the imperial view to inequality as it is manifested in the superiority of the fully civilized few; the democrat insists upon the primacy of rights, the imperialist upon the primacy of obligations; the democratic elevation of freedom and individualism contrasts with the imperial stress on virtue and man’s political nature; the highest purpose of modern democratic government is to encourage the private pursuit of happiness and the source of its legitimacy is popular consent; the purpose of an imperial government is to promote civilization, and “intrinsic merit” is its title to rule. If democratic empire is to be a viable form of government these fundamentally different principles and the practices which spring from them, must be able to coexist within an imperial democracy (Ibid., 66-67).
That is, until subjugated peoples are able to create the conditions for democracy and justice themselves, a good regime, even from afar, can adopt and employ an aristocratic view of what is morally good and politically just for them.
Between the extremist ideology and cruel rule of the Taliban and al-Qaeda on one side and the US policy of defending, securing, and supporting the local population on the other, can’t reasonable people in the Muslim world conclude that sometimes in the grand scheme of things occupiers are really liberators?
Let’s dignify this charge for a moment and take it seriously. What does it mean to be an occupier? What does empire-building entail for both the colonizer and the colonized?
The history of the world is a history of the rise and fall of empires. That’s just how it is. Most recent to date were the British imperial rule in South Asia, America’s colonial rule in the Philippines , the spread of Nazi totalitarian rule across Europe, and the expansion of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, among others. There were good and bad empires. But what makes an empire civilizing, according to Churchill, is when it promotes the interests and welfare of the colonized, hence, “a cure to the disease of tyrannical rule” (Churchill, Liberalism and the Social Problem, 156).
What makes it unjust? An empire is unjust, Churchill says, if it does not help in elevating the uncivilized world from barbarism and savagery towards a life of dignity and well-being. In defending the British Empire, he says that empire-building should not rest only on altruism, nor does it have to be motivated only by self-seeking, narrow interests: "To be just, empire must be grounded on a higher sentiment and principle, but that higher motivation must reside midway between extreme formulas.” This higher motivation lies in an imperial people's desire to improve themselves, for sharing the benefits of civilization with those who do not possess them can make an imperial people more human. In Churchill's view, "Ruling its empire justly further civilizes an imperial nation. At its best, empire is not a burden to be endured but an opportunity for individual and national self-improvement" (Kirk Emmert, Winston S. Churchill on Empire, 53).
Can a democratic nation engage in empire-building? According to Emmert,
Democratic empire would seem to rest on an alliance between two quite different views of justice and the political good. The democratic view looks to equality grounded in a commonly shared humanity, the imperial view to inequality as it is manifested in the superiority of the fully civilized few; the democrat insists upon the primacy of rights, the imperialist upon the primacy of obligations; the democratic elevation of freedom and individualism contrasts with the imperial stress on virtue and man’s political nature; the highest purpose of modern democratic government is to encourage the private pursuit of happiness and the source of its legitimacy is popular consent; the purpose of an imperial government is to promote civilization, and “intrinsic merit” is its title to rule. If democratic empire is to be a viable form of government these fundamentally different principles and the practices which spring from them, must be able to coexist within an imperial democracy (Ibid., 66-67).
That is, until subjugated peoples are able to create the conditions for democracy and justice themselves, a good regime, even from afar, can adopt and employ an aristocratic view of what is morally good and politically just for them.
Between the extremist ideology and cruel rule of the Taliban and al-Qaeda on one side and the US policy of defending, securing, and supporting the local population on the other, can’t reasonable people in the Muslim world conclude that sometimes in the grand scheme of things occupiers are really liberators?
Saturday, December 5, 2009
The Minaret Ban in Switzerland
When majority of Swiss voters endorsed the ban on the building of minarets in Switzerland during its November 29th referendum, they were making a political statement. Contrary to angry reactions from various Muslim groups who saw this vote as an act of suppression of religious liberty, backers of this measure said that it was not their intention to prohibit Muslims from practicing their religion. “The goal, they explained, was to prevent what they described as the growing political impact of Switzerland's Muslim minority, which they said is symbolized by minarets pointing into the sky; women wearing full veils; and observance of sharia, a Koran-based legal system.”1 Walter Wobman, a People’s Party member of Parliament, adds, "The minaret is the power symbol of political Islam and sharia law."
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki of Iran saw otherwise: “values such as tolerance, dialogue and respecting others’ religions should never be put to referendum,” and warned the Swiss of “consequences.”2 This vote, he said, “went against the prestige of a country which claims to be an advocate of democracy and human rights.”
The question of religious liberty vis-à-vis Islam is a complex one. For Islam is at once both a religion and a political system. While it offers a set of moral teachings, it also endorses political power with which to carry out those moral teachings. Inherent in it is the union of clerical and political powers, creating a state within a state, if it happens to flourish in a foreign political community. Granting it the right to exist in the name of religious liberty is providing it space to exist as a political entity.
This, I think, is the political statement that the Swiss voters are telling us. This is also what Tocqueville said in his chapter on religious freedom in democratic settings:
"Muhammad brought down from heaven and put into the Koran not religious doctrines only, but political maxims, criminal and civil laws, and scientific theories. The Gospels, on the other hand, deal only with general relations between man and God and between man and man. Beyond that, they teach nothing and do not oblige people to believe anything. That alone, among a thousand reasons, is enough to show that Islam will not be able to hold its power long in ages of enlightenment and democracy, while Christianity is destined to reign in such ages, as in all others.” (Democracy in America, vol. 2, part 1, chapter 5).
But Christianity has had its dark period as well when, during the Middle Ages, the papacy wielded both ecclesiastic and political powers in its effort to establish a world empire. It took a Reformation to rein in this papal power, leading to the birth of a modern state where, under the principle of separation of church and state, political affairs were left in the hands of the state, and religious matters in the hands of the church.
Modern republicanism upholds the separation of church and state. It is one of the key foundations of the free society. It is basic to individual liberty. By removing theological differences from the political arena, as Professor Harry Jaffa of the Claremont Institute has argued, “people could worship freely according to the dictates of their consciences, thereby promoting confidence and even friendship among citizens.”
Those who are protesting the minaret ban in the name of religious liberty must first understand what it is that should belong to the public realm, and what it is that must be kept private.
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki of Iran saw otherwise: “values such as tolerance, dialogue and respecting others’ religions should never be put to referendum,” and warned the Swiss of “consequences.”2 This vote, he said, “went against the prestige of a country which claims to be an advocate of democracy and human rights.”
The question of religious liberty vis-à-vis Islam is a complex one. For Islam is at once both a religion and a political system. While it offers a set of moral teachings, it also endorses political power with which to carry out those moral teachings. Inherent in it is the union of clerical and political powers, creating a state within a state, if it happens to flourish in a foreign political community. Granting it the right to exist in the name of religious liberty is providing it space to exist as a political entity.
This, I think, is the political statement that the Swiss voters are telling us. This is also what Tocqueville said in his chapter on religious freedom in democratic settings:
"Muhammad brought down from heaven and put into the Koran not religious doctrines only, but political maxims, criminal and civil laws, and scientific theories. The Gospels, on the other hand, deal only with general relations between man and God and between man and man. Beyond that, they teach nothing and do not oblige people to believe anything. That alone, among a thousand reasons, is enough to show that Islam will not be able to hold its power long in ages of enlightenment and democracy, while Christianity is destined to reign in such ages, as in all others.” (Democracy in America, vol. 2, part 1, chapter 5).
But Christianity has had its dark period as well when, during the Middle Ages, the papacy wielded both ecclesiastic and political powers in its effort to establish a world empire. It took a Reformation to rein in this papal power, leading to the birth of a modern state where, under the principle of separation of church and state, political affairs were left in the hands of the state, and religious matters in the hands of the church.
Modern republicanism upholds the separation of church and state. It is one of the key foundations of the free society. It is basic to individual liberty. By removing theological differences from the political arena, as Professor Harry Jaffa of the Claremont Institute has argued, “people could worship freely according to the dictates of their consciences, thereby promoting confidence and even friendship among citizens.”
Those who are protesting the minaret ban in the name of religious liberty must first understand what it is that should belong to the public realm, and what it is that must be kept private.
Sunday, November 29, 2009
One-Man, One-Vote in Honduras’ Constitutional Democracy
The much-awaited presidential election in Honduras finally took place today. There are high stakes riding on this election, namely, “a chance for Honduras to advance beyond the political crisis and regain international legitimacy and access to much-needed aid,” said James Creagan, former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras. It would mean ending a five-month constitutional crisis that began with the ouster of then President Manuel Zelaya who sought to extend his term through a referendum rendered illegal by the Honduran Supreme Court. It would also determine whether the election results would convince the international community to recognize the winner and provide the newly elected government a legitimate stature. As it is, countries in the region, with the exception of the US, Costa Rica, and Panama, have stated that recognizing the outcome of this election would be tantamount to endorsing a process of removing a duly elected president by a “military coup,” as what they alleged the Honduran military did in ousting Zelaya last summer.
I don’t know why Hondurans have to worry about the international community’s non-acceptance of their democratic process. Honduran democracy should march forward with or without the endorsement of the international community. The only real and true test of Honduran democracy is whether every single vote cast by every single Honduran translates itself into a form of consent that empowers a government to rule in his or her interest. Hondurans, every single one of them, are the only source of sovereign power, a power that they share equally with one another through a representative government that they empower to represent their interests. The one-man, one-vote principle in any constitutional democracy translates itself into a representative government whose leaders are chosen by the enlightened consent of its citizenry.
This is a good constitutional measure by which the international community should judge whether the political process in Honduras is democratic or not.
Meanwhile, three cheers for Hondurans for showing the world that they are indeed faithful guardians of their constitutional democracy!
I don’t know why Hondurans have to worry about the international community’s non-acceptance of their democratic process. Honduran democracy should march forward with or without the endorsement of the international community. The only real and true test of Honduran democracy is whether every single vote cast by every single Honduran translates itself into a form of consent that empowers a government to rule in his or her interest. Hondurans, every single one of them, are the only source of sovereign power, a power that they share equally with one another through a representative government that they empower to represent their interests. The one-man, one-vote principle in any constitutional democracy translates itself into a representative government whose leaders are chosen by the enlightened consent of its citizenry.
This is a good constitutional measure by which the international community should judge whether the political process in Honduras is democratic or not.
Meanwhile, three cheers for Hondurans for showing the world that they are indeed faithful guardians of their constitutional democracy!
The Mindanao Massacre
I’m sure every Filipino’s sensibilities (not to mention their sense of justice) were offended by last week’s horrific killing of at least 50 people (including journalists and lawyers) in what appeared to be a tribal war between two powerful Muslim families in Mindanao over the filing of a candidacy for the gubernatorial race by Vice Mayor Ibrahim Mangudadatu, representing the Mangudadatu clan, against the incumbent, Andal Ampatuan, Sr. of the influential Ampatuan clan. World leaders, foreign journalists, and international organizations workers were also quick to condemn what happened.
That's why it was baffling to read in this Philippine Star article that some Filipino Muslim groups would rather raise "the possibility that top government officials may be involved in the massacre in Maguindanao to pave the way for emergency rule in the country.” According to Amina Rasul, chair of the Philippine Council for Islamic Democracy, “some Muslim groups are not convinced that the Ampatuans should be held solely responsible for the killings. . . “The conspiracy may involve the national government,” Rasul said.
Given the mounting evidence to the contrary, such assertion is absurd and irresponsible. It deflects the blame from those who are otherwise guilty of these heinous crimes. It does not serve both truth and justice. It is also clannish and myopic. It is playing politics as usual, Philippine style.
Amina Rasul was a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) fellow. USIP at one time underwrote the US policy towards Mindanao.
What happened last week reveals the political dynamics in these communities and the clannish nature of Mindanao politics. If those engaged in the upcoming peace talk are hoping that transferring power and resources to the Filipino Muslim leadership will resolve the Muslim conflict in the country, they are in for a rude awakening. For as long as these leaders are governed by their oligarchic interests (and religious indignations), they will use that power against the national community and against each other.
That's why it was baffling to read in this Philippine Star article that some Filipino Muslim groups would rather raise "the possibility that top government officials may be involved in the massacre in Maguindanao to pave the way for emergency rule in the country.” According to Amina Rasul, chair of the Philippine Council for Islamic Democracy, “some Muslim groups are not convinced that the Ampatuans should be held solely responsible for the killings. . . “The conspiracy may involve the national government,” Rasul said.
Given the mounting evidence to the contrary, such assertion is absurd and irresponsible. It deflects the blame from those who are otherwise guilty of these heinous crimes. It does not serve both truth and justice. It is also clannish and myopic. It is playing politics as usual, Philippine style.
Amina Rasul was a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) fellow. USIP at one time underwrote the US policy towards Mindanao.
What happened last week reveals the political dynamics in these communities and the clannish nature of Mindanao politics. If those engaged in the upcoming peace talk are hoping that transferring power and resources to the Filipino Muslim leadership will resolve the Muslim conflict in the country, they are in for a rude awakening. For as long as these leaders are governed by their oligarchic interests (and religious indignations), they will use that power against the national community and against each other.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
An Afghan Initiative
It is heartening to know that anti-Taliban militias have sprouted in different parts of Afghanistan, “prompting hopes of a large-scale tribal rebellion against the Taliban,” so reports the New York Times in this piece, As Afghans Resist Taliban, U.S. Spurs Rise of Militias. It has also encouraged American and Afghan officials to spawn the growth of other armed militias – under the plan “Community Defense Initiative” -- right on Taliban territory in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan.
This is encouraging. For one, the initiative comes from the Afghans themselves. Taking responsibility for their own security means that they are beginning to have a moral clarity about what is at stake in this war, namely, not to allow the Taliban to rule their country once again. A Taliban rule would mean perpetuating a way of life that is steeped in ignorance, falsehood, and religious myths. The Afghans also know that a Taliban comeback would mean allowing a cruel, autocratic rule to prevent them back from pursuing a life of dignity, peace, and well-being.
But the article also alludes to potential dangers under this plan: the militias could turn against the Afghan and American governments and also against each other in a culture where warlordism is part of the country’s social infrastructure. These are legitimate concerns. A practical solution lies in establishing institutional checks on these militias, at the community, national, and even international levels. In the NY piece, the US says that it will go about this by keeping the groups small and limiting "the scope of their activities to protecting villages and manning checkpoints."
But more should be required of these militias. They should be linked to institutions that could control both their conduct and activities effectively. At the community level, for instance, their militia activities should be linked to familial duties and obligations. They should be persuaded to think that what they are doing is for the good of their families and communities. Their mothers, wives, and daughters should be co-opted in terms of organizing them into economic associations or small business enterprises, or providing them with education and health care opportunities. If this happens, their welfare now becomes linked with the goals of the militias to rid their community of bad elements. This is not a new idea, but implementing it will probably yield effective results.
At the national level, the Afghan government (as mentioned in the article) should link these militias with the Afghan national police and perhaps put them on their payroll to make them accountable for all their actions. And at the international level (also mentioned in the article), Americans and other international groups will provide the economic and security resources.
My underlying cause for optimism, of course, is the beginning recognition on the part of these Afghans that the good must prevail, and that they must fight for it themselves.
And on this Thanksgiving season, special thanks goes to the Special Forces -- those unsung heroes who do make things happen.
This is encouraging. For one, the initiative comes from the Afghans themselves. Taking responsibility for their own security means that they are beginning to have a moral clarity about what is at stake in this war, namely, not to allow the Taliban to rule their country once again. A Taliban rule would mean perpetuating a way of life that is steeped in ignorance, falsehood, and religious myths. The Afghans also know that a Taliban comeback would mean allowing a cruel, autocratic rule to prevent them back from pursuing a life of dignity, peace, and well-being.
But the article also alludes to potential dangers under this plan: the militias could turn against the Afghan and American governments and also against each other in a culture where warlordism is part of the country’s social infrastructure. These are legitimate concerns. A practical solution lies in establishing institutional checks on these militias, at the community, national, and even international levels. In the NY piece, the US says that it will go about this by keeping the groups small and limiting "the scope of their activities to protecting villages and manning checkpoints."
But more should be required of these militias. They should be linked to institutions that could control both their conduct and activities effectively. At the community level, for instance, their militia activities should be linked to familial duties and obligations. They should be persuaded to think that what they are doing is for the good of their families and communities. Their mothers, wives, and daughters should be co-opted in terms of organizing them into economic associations or small business enterprises, or providing them with education and health care opportunities. If this happens, their welfare now becomes linked with the goals of the militias to rid their community of bad elements. This is not a new idea, but implementing it will probably yield effective results.
At the national level, the Afghan government (as mentioned in the article) should link these militias with the Afghan national police and perhaps put them on their payroll to make them accountable for all their actions. And at the international level (also mentioned in the article), Americans and other international groups will provide the economic and security resources.
My underlying cause for optimism, of course, is the beginning recognition on the part of these Afghans that the good must prevail, and that they must fight for it themselves.
And on this Thanksgiving season, special thanks goes to the Special Forces -- those unsung heroes who do make things happen.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Shari’a and Decency Laws in Sudan
How should one dress up decently in Sudan? According to the country’s decency laws imposed by the Islamist ruling party, to be decently dressed is for women not to wear a pair of pants, not to show too much wrist or ankle, not to let a woman’s head scarf slip. To do so would merit public flogging (either with a leather whip or a bamboo cane). Lubna Hussein, a Sudanese journalist, was about to be subjected to it had it not been for international pressure and open support from men and women in her country. In defiance, she continues to fight Sudan’s decency laws, with a promise that “I will only wear pants,” and since her sentencing, she has made true that promise.
Many Sudanese women are not so lucky. In this WP piece, about 40,000 women were arrested on charges of violating these decency laws last year. For months, Sudanese women recalled, “a man wearing a red bandana around his head and a whip on his waist was posted at a crowded bus station. He would call out to women he decided were showing too much wrist or ankle and whip them on the spot. Sometimes he would spit on them, they said.”
We who live in a liberal culture are aghast, of course. But that’s understating it. We are outraged at this example of man’s inhumanity to man. This is a form of slavery, of imposing total control over the lives of mothers, sisters, daughters who otherwise would make happy homes for these men.
But the more curious question to ask is why is it that there seems to be no moral outrage from the Islamic world about incidents like the above? Perhaps to them and to their clerics especially, women’s clothing is a way to inculcate modesty in women and self-restraint in men. They would argue that such restrictions should not be viewed as tools of oppression; that the aim of the Islamist regime through its shari’a laws is to attain virtue.
But how could shari’a laws be spiritually liberating to some and be oppressive to others? And I wonder, though, in the absence of such state restrictions, would these men and women continue to live a life of virtue?
Doesn’t virtue come from habituating one’s self in ways that are good and just and reasonable? Does it have to depend so much on externalities such as women's clothing as on a conscious, personal cultivation of it, entailing nothing less than self-mastery and the disciplining of one's self?
Many Sudanese women are not so lucky. In this WP piece, about 40,000 women were arrested on charges of violating these decency laws last year. For months, Sudanese women recalled, “a man wearing a red bandana around his head and a whip on his waist was posted at a crowded bus station. He would call out to women he decided were showing too much wrist or ankle and whip them on the spot. Sometimes he would spit on them, they said.”
We who live in a liberal culture are aghast, of course. But that’s understating it. We are outraged at this example of man’s inhumanity to man. This is a form of slavery, of imposing total control over the lives of mothers, sisters, daughters who otherwise would make happy homes for these men.
But the more curious question to ask is why is it that there seems to be no moral outrage from the Islamic world about incidents like the above? Perhaps to them and to their clerics especially, women’s clothing is a way to inculcate modesty in women and self-restraint in men. They would argue that such restrictions should not be viewed as tools of oppression; that the aim of the Islamist regime through its shari’a laws is to attain virtue.
But how could shari’a laws be spiritually liberating to some and be oppressive to others? And I wonder, though, in the absence of such state restrictions, would these men and women continue to live a life of virtue?
Doesn’t virtue come from habituating one’s self in ways that are good and just and reasonable? Does it have to depend so much on externalities such as women's clothing as on a conscious, personal cultivation of it, entailing nothing less than self-mastery and the disciplining of one's self?
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Does Suicide Bombing Have a Moral Equivalence?
Maj. Nidal M. Hasan, a 39-year-old Arlington-born psychiatrist, who shot and killed at least 13 and wounded a number of military personnel at Fort Hood last week, seems to think that suicide bombing and soldiering are morally equivalent. In one of his web postings, he argued that suicide bombers are no different from a soldier who throws himself on a grenade to save the lives of others:
To say that this soldier committed suicide is inappropriate. It’s more appropriate to say he is a brave hero that sacrificed his life for a more noble cause," said the Internet posting. "Scholars have paralled (sic) this to suicide bombers whose intention, by sacrificing their lives, is to help save Muslims by killing enemy soldiers.
Whether this was what motivated him to engage in this shooting rampage is yet to be determined. Newspaper reports said that he did not like the idea of getting deployed to Afghanistan and fighting a war that to him is a war against his religion.
Juxtapose this thinking against the thinking of Maj. L. Eduardo Caraveo, an army psychologist from Woodbridge, who was one of those killed. A native of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the Washington Post reports that he came to America with little knowledge of English, sold newspapers to get by, and went on to get a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Arizona. (I don’t think it is by accident that the WP posted these two stories side by side on its front page today). One of his friends said that while he was happy being at home, he understood “what it meant to serve his country.” And so on the day after he arrived at Fort Hood, as he was filling out paper works and getting ready to step into a “life devoted to helping people through their most stressful times,” he lost his life in the hands of Hasan.
Both have a moral argument to offer.
To Hasan’s thinking, a suicide bomber embraces martyrdom for God and religion. He sacrifices his life to protect his faith against those who do not believe in it.
To Caraveo, a soldier embraces martyrdom for God and country. He sacrifices his life to protect his country and defend the innocent from its enemies. He offers his life so that others may live. In his worldview, he has a duty to preserve a certain kind of order where people are able to live in dignity, peace, and prosperity.
The former wants to defend his religion against infidels so that he can build a City of God on earth and preserve pure worship. As if God needs us to defend Himself from unbelievers! This sense of self-righteousness leads to a moral indignation that can only lead to fanaticism, intolerance, and blind prejudices that justify the use of violence. The latter seeks only to preserve the social order, to make life in the City of Man peaceful and orderly. There are bad regimes, however, that put their soldiers to ill-use.
At a minimum, all of us humans only desire to live peaceably with one another, go through this life the best way we can. We educate ourselves, send our children to school, and contribute our talents towards the progress of our community. With our sense of inventiveness and creativity, we have succeeded in taming the harsh forces of nature. We build industries and engage in commerce, knowing that maximizing our potentials is what is expected of us. The City of Man is not in opposition to the City of God; it leads to it, and that indeed through right reason, all societies – Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. – can appreciate common standards of good and justice.
Aren’t the opposite of all of the above – intolerance, hatred, injustice, ignorance, violence – inhuman and ungodly? So I pose this question again: is there really a moral equivalence to suicide bombing?
To say that this soldier committed suicide is inappropriate. It’s more appropriate to say he is a brave hero that sacrificed his life for a more noble cause," said the Internet posting. "Scholars have paralled (sic) this to suicide bombers whose intention, by sacrificing their lives, is to help save Muslims by killing enemy soldiers.
Whether this was what motivated him to engage in this shooting rampage is yet to be determined. Newspaper reports said that he did not like the idea of getting deployed to Afghanistan and fighting a war that to him is a war against his religion.
Juxtapose this thinking against the thinking of Maj. L. Eduardo Caraveo, an army psychologist from Woodbridge, who was one of those killed. A native of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the Washington Post reports that he came to America with little knowledge of English, sold newspapers to get by, and went on to get a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Arizona. (I don’t think it is by accident that the WP posted these two stories side by side on its front page today). One of his friends said that while he was happy being at home, he understood “what it meant to serve his country.” And so on the day after he arrived at Fort Hood, as he was filling out paper works and getting ready to step into a “life devoted to helping people through their most stressful times,” he lost his life in the hands of Hasan.
Both have a moral argument to offer.
To Hasan’s thinking, a suicide bomber embraces martyrdom for God and religion. He sacrifices his life to protect his faith against those who do not believe in it.
To Caraveo, a soldier embraces martyrdom for God and country. He sacrifices his life to protect his country and defend the innocent from its enemies. He offers his life so that others may live. In his worldview, he has a duty to preserve a certain kind of order where people are able to live in dignity, peace, and prosperity.
The former wants to defend his religion against infidels so that he can build a City of God on earth and preserve pure worship. As if God needs us to defend Himself from unbelievers! This sense of self-righteousness leads to a moral indignation that can only lead to fanaticism, intolerance, and blind prejudices that justify the use of violence. The latter seeks only to preserve the social order, to make life in the City of Man peaceful and orderly. There are bad regimes, however, that put their soldiers to ill-use.
At a minimum, all of us humans only desire to live peaceably with one another, go through this life the best way we can. We educate ourselves, send our children to school, and contribute our talents towards the progress of our community. With our sense of inventiveness and creativity, we have succeeded in taming the harsh forces of nature. We build industries and engage in commerce, knowing that maximizing our potentials is what is expected of us. The City of Man is not in opposition to the City of God; it leads to it, and that indeed through right reason, all societies – Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. – can appreciate common standards of good and justice.
Aren’t the opposite of all of the above – intolerance, hatred, injustice, ignorance, violence – inhuman and ungodly? So I pose this question again: is there really a moral equivalence to suicide bombing?
Monday, October 26, 2009
On Governing and Afghanistan
In today’s Washington Post article, “U.S. Tested 2 Afghan Scenarios in War Game,”
One question being debated is whether more U.S. troops would improve the performance of the Afghan government by providing an important check on corruption and the drug trade, or would they stunt the growth of the Afghan government as U.S. troops and civilians take on more tasks that Afghans might better perform themselves.
In another article that appeared in the print edition of the Wall Street Journal Weekend Edition (October 24-25, 2009) entitled, “Quite Strategy Put to the Test,” the author, James Hookway, argues for replicating the small successes of the US troops in the jungles of southern Philippines, but is quick to add that this has been made possible only because a functioning government is in place, willing to cooperate and requiring only some extra help, rather than the bottom-up nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So, it seems that a central point in the current strategy debate revolves around the issue of governance: that an effective and strong Afghan government is a necessary condition for any military strategy to succeed. But what does an effective and strong government entail? Or, better yet, how do we create a strong and effective government in Afghanistan?
In semi-anarchic states like Afghanistan, I think that what is needed is either a form of government where a civilian leader wields military powers, or a form of government where a military leader wields civilian powers. (America’s early colonial administration of the Philippines started with a military governor wielding executive power until a civil governor was put in place.) If neither is feasible, the best thing to hope for is to have a national government in Afghanistan that is “technocratic” in nature, that is, the kind that engages in the practical aspect of governing, results-oriented, professional and uses its power for nation-building on how to provide and facilitate public services, on building community-based institutions, on how to support small businesses and create jobs, etc . A government, in short, that gets things done!
Also, if that leadership understands that the lack of freedom of religion in the country is what causes societal animosities among its people, and, by a stroke of a pen, declares a separation between church and state, thereby guaranteeing freedom of religion to everyone, even assuring the Taliban that they are free to worship however they want but requiring of them to respect others in the way they choose to worship, peace and national reconciliation can be achieved without bloodshed. Am I being unrealistic about this? Yes. Too idealistic? Yes. Sometimes, though, it takes only one enlightened leader to make things happen, there in that realm where reason, justice, and power meet.
Subjecting Afghanistan to elections of competing yet ill-informed political parties does conform to our Western notion of governance. As to the question of whether a government that is formed out of this process will yield good results, the answer is not hard to predict.
Saturday, October 17, 2009
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Honduras: It’s Time We Get This Right
We should be thankful to Senator Demint (R-SC) and his delegation for paying Honduras’ defacto government a visit (“What I Heard in Honduras,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2009), if only to tell Hondurans that not everyone in Washington DC is crazy and unreasonable. For it seems like it – notwithstanding legal analyses justifying the removal of Manuel Zelaya from office by experts on the Honduran constitution, including legal analysts at the Congressional Research Services, and a reasonable explanation of the limited power of the de facto government by Robert Micheletti (“Moving Forward in Honduras, Washington Post, September 22, 2009), the State Department and the Organization of American States continue to punish Honduras by withholding US aid to its people and by promising not to honor the results of its November presidential elections. The OAS even said that it would not recognize any regime that comes into power after the coup, as that would mean a violation of provisions of the Democratic Charter that uphold the legitimacy of officials that win popular elections.
But a democracy that is grounded on mere procedures is only a procedural kind of democracy, one that is devoid of substance and principles. It does not acknowledge that there are certain standards of government and politics that focus not only on processes and methods but on standards of what is right and just. The nature of a democratic regime is such that it wields power in the interest of its people. A ruler who promotes his own interests goes against the very nature of that regime. The US Declaration of Independence states that when governments become abusive of their powers, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”
Why does it seem difficult for the OAS and the State Department to see that sometimes it is necessary to protect democracy against, yes, even “democratically elected presidents” who become abusive of their power! It should take more than a literal interpretation of an organizational charter to determine whether what happened in Honduras was the case of the spirit of the law informing the letter of the law.
That the OAS and the State Department find themselves in agreement with thugs of Latin America -- Chavez and his ilk -- should tell them something. Steady in its course and refusing to be bullied by the bullies of this world, Honduras is offering an important lesson to the entire region on how to be a jealous guardian of democratic principles. It is a fascinating study in democratic revolutions, the rule of law, and the spirit of the law. It's also a study of what is reasonable and decent over thuggery and deceit.
To us students of politics, Honduras is a case in constitutional democratic experimentation that may just prove to be the model that Latin America needs to emulate.
For the US, it offers an occasion for self-examination. We ask Senator DeMint to call for a congressional hearing, question the State Department over its stubborn refusal to change its policy position, and assure Hondurans that we are indeed their friends in constitutional democracy.
But a democracy that is grounded on mere procedures is only a procedural kind of democracy, one that is devoid of substance and principles. It does not acknowledge that there are certain standards of government and politics that focus not only on processes and methods but on standards of what is right and just. The nature of a democratic regime is such that it wields power in the interest of its people. A ruler who promotes his own interests goes against the very nature of that regime. The US Declaration of Independence states that when governments become abusive of their powers, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”
Why does it seem difficult for the OAS and the State Department to see that sometimes it is necessary to protect democracy against, yes, even “democratically elected presidents” who become abusive of their power! It should take more than a literal interpretation of an organizational charter to determine whether what happened in Honduras was the case of the spirit of the law informing the letter of the law.
That the OAS and the State Department find themselves in agreement with thugs of Latin America -- Chavez and his ilk -- should tell them something. Steady in its course and refusing to be bullied by the bullies of this world, Honduras is offering an important lesson to the entire region on how to be a jealous guardian of democratic principles. It is a fascinating study in democratic revolutions, the rule of law, and the spirit of the law. It's also a study of what is reasonable and decent over thuggery and deceit.
To us students of politics, Honduras is a case in constitutional democratic experimentation that may just prove to be the model that Latin America needs to emulate.
For the US, it offers an occasion for self-examination. We ask Senator DeMint to call for a congressional hearing, question the State Department over its stubborn refusal to change its policy position, and assure Hondurans that we are indeed their friends in constitutional democracy.
Sunday, October 4, 2009
Afghanistan Should Also Try and Earn Our Trust
David Ignatius in his Washington Post piece today (Sunday, October 4, 2009) described similarities in the strategy pursued by the Pakistani military during their successful offensive against the Taliban in Swat Valley and the one being laid out by Gen. McChrystal . . . except on matter of trust:
"McChrystal's strategy echoes some of the Pakistani precepts -- more troops, more focus on the population, more security. But even with an additional 40,000 troops, the United States won't have the same popular support the Pakistanis enjoyed in Swat. America is fighting what many Afghans will always regard as a war of occupation. People aren't going to "fall in love" with U.S. troops."
And then he adds:
"The right Afghanistan policy begins with a frank admission that this isn't America's problem, it's Afghanistan's. The United States needs to patiently support the emerging Afghan government, keeping our troop levels firm and reliable, until the Afghans acquire the tools and political consensus to secure their country."
If the population-centric approach of Gen. McChrystal revolves around winning the trust and confidence of the local population, it should work both ways. We have the right to ask whether the people of Afghanistan are deserving of that effort. For if the local population remains tainted (with some of them exhibiting allegiances and loyalties for the enemy), coopting them through this strategy will yield little success. The only way we can trust them is if they prove to us that they are capable of using those tools against the enemy.
"McChrystal's strategy echoes some of the Pakistani precepts -- more troops, more focus on the population, more security. But even with an additional 40,000 troops, the United States won't have the same popular support the Pakistanis enjoyed in Swat. America is fighting what many Afghans will always regard as a war of occupation. People aren't going to "fall in love" with U.S. troops."
And then he adds:
"The right Afghanistan policy begins with a frank admission that this isn't America's problem, it's Afghanistan's. The United States needs to patiently support the emerging Afghan government, keeping our troop levels firm and reliable, until the Afghans acquire the tools and political consensus to secure their country."
If the population-centric approach of Gen. McChrystal revolves around winning the trust and confidence of the local population, it should work both ways. We have the right to ask whether the people of Afghanistan are deserving of that effort. For if the local population remains tainted (with some of them exhibiting allegiances and loyalties for the enemy), coopting them through this strategy will yield little success. The only way we can trust them is if they prove to us that they are capable of using those tools against the enemy.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Which Afghanistan Strategy? They Ask
I have been reading stuff about how best to go forward in Afghanistan. I watched several TV Sunday shows this morning and listened to political pundits and government officials give their take on what kind of strategy would work best in a war that has dragged on for some eight years now. I also read Gen. Stan McChrystal’s assessment report, but not perhaps with the kind of serious attention it deserves. For the questions I am going to raise below have been probably answered there. Having no military background or military knowledge, I probably did not see the nuances and implications hidden in the strategy laid out before me.
For one, for all the talks about increasing the number of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) as well as the Afghan military and police forces, I didn’t see in the report any piece of information about the total number of insurgents we’re dealing with in Afghanistan. That number is important, and if we have no idea how many insurgents there are right now, how can we determine the right amount of resources to use against them?
Perhaps it’s safe to say that we don’t have much knowledge about the enemy, their source of funding, their habits and characteristics, their elusiveness as they weave themselves in and out of villages and communities even as they take advantage of their familiarity with local traditions. If we want to win, we have to know the enemy first.
Of course, the ones who know them the most are the locals themselves. It makes me wonder why, instead of increasing the number of US/NATO forces, we are not creating or recruiting counterinsurgency groups out of brave local villagers whose mission and only mission will be to go after the bad guys. It seems to be an appropriate response (counterinsurgents vs. insurgents) in a society whose social infrastructure remains tribal and where warlords continue to play a dominant leadership role. Why not identify and mobilize them, those anti-Taliban tribal leaders (the likes of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, a relentless Taliban fighter who served as the commander of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), who will do everything they can in order to attain a state of well-being and dignity for their country and their people? But even if they have less lofty interests with which to motivate them to join – money, jobs, etc., -- their occupying the frontline in this war should be all worth it. Organizing and mobilizing them, of course, will require support and resources, but the effort should not be as expensive.
The tactic of using local militias has already been proven successful in Iraq. By coopting and convincing Sunni insurgents to come to our side, we helped create a group, the Sunni Awakening that largely became instrumental in booting al-Qaeda out of Iraq.
The second question I have in regard to the report is whether a population-centric approach precedes the achievement of an environment of security rather than the other way around. That is, can political, economic, and social programs be used as means to achieve security, or should security be achieved first before these programs can have an impact on winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people? If the latter, then what we’re doing in Afghanistan is more of a communication campaign, rather than effectively engaging the Taliban.
To engage the Taliban, we should not put the population on the defensive. If we do so, we make them all the more feeble and weak. We have to empower them instead, put them on the offensive, and make this war their war. It will offer them moral clarity. It will make them strong stakeholders in the future of their country.
Our long-term support should come in the form of training and education, effective governance and the rule of law, a free-market economy. Meanwhile, the short-term ones, the more urgent ones, necessitate equipping them with tools they will need to fight off the bad guys: communication tools like cell phones and computers that can immediately connect them to the US/Nato and Afghan security forces when they need their help; weapons that can incapacitate the enemy; access to an underground network of freedom fighters and informants that can give them hidden yet real protection, and more.
The current strategy is a step ahead of what needs to be done first. We must engage the enemy first.
For one, for all the talks about increasing the number of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) as well as the Afghan military and police forces, I didn’t see in the report any piece of information about the total number of insurgents we’re dealing with in Afghanistan. That number is important, and if we have no idea how many insurgents there are right now, how can we determine the right amount of resources to use against them?
Perhaps it’s safe to say that we don’t have much knowledge about the enemy, their source of funding, their habits and characteristics, their elusiveness as they weave themselves in and out of villages and communities even as they take advantage of their familiarity with local traditions. If we want to win, we have to know the enemy first.
Of course, the ones who know them the most are the locals themselves. It makes me wonder why, instead of increasing the number of US/NATO forces, we are not creating or recruiting counterinsurgency groups out of brave local villagers whose mission and only mission will be to go after the bad guys. It seems to be an appropriate response (counterinsurgents vs. insurgents) in a society whose social infrastructure remains tribal and where warlords continue to play a dominant leadership role. Why not identify and mobilize them, those anti-Taliban tribal leaders (the likes of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, a relentless Taliban fighter who served as the commander of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), who will do everything they can in order to attain a state of well-being and dignity for their country and their people? But even if they have less lofty interests with which to motivate them to join – money, jobs, etc., -- their occupying the frontline in this war should be all worth it. Organizing and mobilizing them, of course, will require support and resources, but the effort should not be as expensive.
The tactic of using local militias has already been proven successful in Iraq. By coopting and convincing Sunni insurgents to come to our side, we helped create a group, the Sunni Awakening that largely became instrumental in booting al-Qaeda out of Iraq.
The second question I have in regard to the report is whether a population-centric approach precedes the achievement of an environment of security rather than the other way around. That is, can political, economic, and social programs be used as means to achieve security, or should security be achieved first before these programs can have an impact on winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people? If the latter, then what we’re doing in Afghanistan is more of a communication campaign, rather than effectively engaging the Taliban.
To engage the Taliban, we should not put the population on the defensive. If we do so, we make them all the more feeble and weak. We have to empower them instead, put them on the offensive, and make this war their war. It will offer them moral clarity. It will make them strong stakeholders in the future of their country.
Our long-term support should come in the form of training and education, effective governance and the rule of law, a free-market economy. Meanwhile, the short-term ones, the more urgent ones, necessitate equipping them with tools they will need to fight off the bad guys: communication tools like cell phones and computers that can immediately connect them to the US/Nato and Afghan security forces when they need their help; weapons that can incapacitate the enemy; access to an underground network of freedom fighters and informants that can give them hidden yet real protection, and more.
The current strategy is a step ahead of what needs to be done first. We must engage the enemy first.
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