On Governing and Afghanistan

In today’s Washington Post article, “U.S. Tested 2 Afghan Scenarios in War Game,”

One question being debated is whether more U.S. troops would improve the performance of the Afghan government by providing an important check on corruption and the drug trade, or would they stunt the growth of the Afghan government as U.S. troops and civilians take on more tasks that Afghans might better perform themselves.

In another article that appeared in the print edition of the Wall Street Journal Weekend Edition (October 24-25, 2009) entitled, “Quite Strategy Put to the Test,” the author, James Hookway, argues for replicating the small successes of the US troops in the jungles of southern Philippines, but is quick to add that this has been made possible only because a functioning government is in place, willing to cooperate and requiring only some extra help, rather than the bottom-up nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So, it seems that a central point in the current strategy debate revolves around the issue of governance: that an effective and strong Afghan government is a necessary condition for any military strategy to succeed. But what does an effective and strong government entail? Or, better yet, how do we create a strong and effective government in Afghanistan?

In semi-anarchic states like Afghanistan, I think that what is needed is either a form of government where a civilian leader wields military powers, or a form of government where a military leader wields civilian powers. (America’s early colonial administration of the Philippines started with a military governor wielding executive power until a civil governor was put in place.) If neither is feasible, the best thing to hope for is to have a national government in Afghanistan that is “technocratic” in nature, that is, the kind that engages in the practical aspect of governing, results-oriented, professional and uses its power for nation-building on how to provide and facilitate public services, on building community-based institutions, on how to support small businesses and create jobs, etc . A government, in short, that gets things done!

Also, if that leadership understands that the lack of freedom of religion in the country is what causes societal animosities among its people, and, by a stroke of a pen, declares a separation between church and state, thereby guaranteeing freedom of religion to everyone, even assuring the Taliban that they are free to worship however they want but requiring of them to respect others in the way they choose to worship, peace and national reconciliation can be achieved without bloodshed. Am I being unrealistic about this? Yes. Too idealistic? Yes. Sometimes, though, it takes only one enlightened leader to make things happen, there in that realm where reason, justice, and power meet.

Subjecting Afghanistan to elections of competing yet ill-informed political parties does conform to our Western notion of governance. As to the question of whether a government that is formed out of this process will yield good results, the answer is not hard to predict.

Hear! Hear!

A Fair Plan for Honduras: A Lesson from Nicaragua Could Solve This Crisis
by James A. Baker III

Honduras: It’s Time We Get This Right

We should be thankful to Senator Demint (R-SC) and his delegation for paying Honduras’ defacto government a visit (“What I Heard in Honduras,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2009), if only to tell Hondurans that not everyone in Washington DC is crazy and unreasonable. For it seems like it – notwithstanding legal analyses justifying the removal of Manuel Zelaya from office by experts on the Honduran constitution, including legal analysts at the Congressional Research Services, and a reasonable explanation of the limited power of the de facto government by Robert Micheletti (“Moving Forward in Honduras, Washington Post, September 22, 2009), the State Department and the Organization of American States continue to punish Honduras by withholding US aid to its people and by promising not to honor the results of its November presidential elections. The OAS even said that it would not recognize any regime that comes into power after the coup, as that would mean a violation of provisions of the Democratic Charter that uphold the legitimacy of officials that win popular elections.

But a democracy that is grounded on mere procedures is only a procedural kind of democracy, one that is devoid of substance and principles. It does not acknowledge that there are certain standards of government and politics that focus not only on processes and methods but on standards of what is right and just. The nature of a democratic regime is such that it wields power in the interest of its people. A ruler who promotes his own interests goes against the very nature of that regime. The US Declaration of Independence states that when governments become abusive of their powers, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

Why does it seem difficult for the OAS and the State Department to see that sometimes it is necessary to protect democracy against, yes, even “democratically elected presidents” who become abusive of their power! It should take more than a literal interpretation of an organizational charter to determine whether what happened in Honduras was the case of the spirit of the law informing the letter of the law.

That the OAS and the State Department find themselves in agreement with thugs of Latin America -- Chavez and his ilk -- should tell them something. Steady in its course and refusing to be bullied by the bullies of this world, Honduras is offering an important lesson to the entire region on how to be a jealous guardian of democratic principles. It is a fascinating study in democratic revolutions, the rule of law, and the spirit of the law. It's also a study of what is reasonable and decent over thuggery and deceit.

To us students of politics, Honduras is a case in constitutional democratic experimentation that may just prove to be the model that Latin America needs to emulate.

For the US, it offers an occasion for self-examination. We ask Senator DeMint to call for a congressional hearing, question the State Department over its stubborn refusal to change its policy position, and assure Hondurans that we are indeed their friends in constitutional democracy.

Afghanistan Should Also Try and Earn Our Trust

David Ignatius in his Washington Post piece today (Sunday, October 4, 2009) described similarities in the strategy pursued by the Pakistani military during their successful offensive against the Taliban in Swat Valley and the one being laid out by Gen. McChrystal . . . except on matter of trust:

"McChrystal's strategy echoes some of the Pakistani precepts -- more troops, more focus on the population, more security. But even with an additional 40,000 troops, the United States won't have the same popular support the Pakistanis enjoyed in Swat. America is fighting what many Afghans will always regard as a war of occupation. People aren't going to "fall in love" with U.S. troops."

And then he adds:

"The right Afghanistan policy begins with a frank admission that this isn't America's problem, it's Afghanistan's. The United States needs to patiently support the emerging Afghan government, keeping our troop levels firm and reliable, until the Afghans acquire the tools and political consensus to secure their country."

If the population-centric approach of Gen. McChrystal revolves around winning the trust and confidence of the local population, it should work both ways. We have the right to ask whether the people of Afghanistan are deserving of that effort. For if the local population remains tainted (with some of them exhibiting allegiances and loyalties for the enemy), coopting them through this strategy will yield little success. The only way we can trust them is if they prove to us that they are capable of using those tools against the enemy.

Which Afghanistan Strategy? They Ask

I have been reading stuff about how best to go forward in Afghanistan. I watched several TV Sunday shows this morning and listened to political pundits and government officials give their take on what kind of strategy would work best in a war that has dragged on for some eight years now. I also read Gen. Stan McChrystal’s assessment report, but not perhaps with the kind of serious attention it deserves. For the questions I am going to raise below have been probably answered there. Having no military background or military knowledge, I probably did not see the nuances and implications hidden in the strategy laid out before me.

For one, for all the talks about increasing the number of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) as well as the Afghan military and police forces, I didn’t see in the report any piece of information about the total number of insurgents we’re dealing with in Afghanistan. That number is important, and if we have no idea how many insurgents there are right now, how can we determine the right amount of resources to use against them?

Perhaps it’s safe to say that we don’t have much knowledge about the enemy, their source of funding, their habits and characteristics, their elusiveness as they weave themselves in and out of villages and communities even as they take advantage of their familiarity with local traditions. If we want to win, we have to know the enemy first.

Of course, the ones who know them the most are the locals themselves. It makes me wonder why, instead of increasing the number of US/NATO forces, we are not creating or recruiting counterinsurgency groups out of brave local villagers whose mission and only mission will be to go after the bad guys. It seems to be an appropriate response (counterinsurgents vs. insurgents) in a society whose social infrastructure remains tribal and where warlords continue to play a dominant leadership role. Why not identify and mobilize them, those anti-Taliban tribal leaders (the likes of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, a relentless Taliban fighter who served as the commander of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), who will do everything they can in order to attain a state of well-being and dignity for their country and their people? But even if they have less lofty interests with which to motivate them to join – money, jobs, etc., -- their occupying the frontline in this war should be all worth it. Organizing and mobilizing them, of course, will require support and resources, but the effort should not be as expensive.

The tactic of using local militias has already been proven successful in Iraq. By coopting and convincing Sunni insurgents to come to our side, we helped create a group, the Sunni Awakening that largely became instrumental in booting al-Qaeda out of Iraq.

The second question I have in regard to the report is whether a population-centric approach precedes the achievement of an environment of security rather than the other way around. That is, can political, economic, and social programs be used as means to achieve security, or should security be achieved first before these programs can have an impact on winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people? If the latter, then what we’re doing in Afghanistan is more of a communication campaign, rather than effectively engaging the Taliban.

To engage the Taliban, we should not put the population on the defensive. If we do so, we make them all the more feeble and weak. We have to empower them instead, put them on the offensive, and make this war their war. It will offer them moral clarity. It will make them strong stakeholders in the future of their country.

Our long-term support should come in the form of training and education, effective governance and the rule of law, a free-market economy. Meanwhile, the short-term ones, the more urgent ones, necessitate equipping them with tools they will need to fight off the bad guys: communication tools like cell phones and computers that can immediately connect them to the US/Nato and Afghan security forces when they need their help; weapons that can incapacitate the enemy; access to an underground network of freedom fighters and informants that can give them hidden yet real protection, and more.

The current strategy is a step ahead of what needs to be done first. We must engage the enemy first.

If the MILF Wants Genuine Peace, It Should Disarm

Violence has spread in several towns in Mindanao, including the killing of 33 people, in the aftermath of a collapsed peace talk between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The MILF leadership, however, distances itself from what has happened, saying that it has no control over its rampaging field commanders. A Filipino political scientist, in an op-ed piece, points out the importance of making this distinction between the leadership of the insurgency group and its uncontrollable fighters, arguing that if ever peace efforts are to advance in Mindanao, reasonable elements within the MILF are what the Philippine government must capitalize on.

I will argue, however, that if the MILF leadership wanted genuine peace from the very beginning, the first item that should have been discussed during those peace talks was on how to disarm the rebel organization, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Any peace talk is premised on this issue. But the MILF has another agenda in mind: its intent all along is to secede from the Philippines, establish its own Islamic republic, implement its own laws, and create its own security force.

So, if war is taking place in Mindanao right now, it's because it never went away; the lull that took place during the peace talk was artificial, where the MILF, thanks to ignorant and unsuspecting forces, gained the upper hand.

“In Egypt, Some Women Say That Veils Increase Harassment”

In a Muslim country where the numbers of women wearing the veil are rising, and so – by most accounts – are incidents of groping and catcalls in the streets . . .” The more women veil the less men learn to behave as decent and civilized members of society . . . And the more women are harassed, the more they veil thinking it will ‘protect’ them,” says Mona Eltahaway, an Egyptian
social commentator.

The above seems to contradict the moral purpose intended by shari’a laws on why Muslim women should wear their veils: to inculcate modesty in women and self-restraint in men. But as this piece shows, it seems to have an opposite effect. The veil has come to represent fear in Egyptian women and uncontrollable desires in Egyptian men. This has both moral and political implications.

Morally speaking, virtue, as everyone knows, should not depend on externalities but on one’s personal cultivation of it, in the way he or she habituates himself in the ways of virtue. Politically speaking, if Egyptian women want to be treated as human beings equal to all and not as objects of sexual harassment, they should rethink why they would like to continue wearing the veil.