On Governing and Afghanistan

In today’s Washington Post article, “U.S. Tested 2 Afghan Scenarios in War Game,”

One question being debated is whether more U.S. troops would improve the performance of the Afghan government by providing an important check on corruption and the drug trade, or would they stunt the growth of the Afghan government as U.S. troops and civilians take on more tasks that Afghans might better perform themselves.

In another article that appeared in the print edition of the Wall Street Journal Weekend Edition (October 24-25, 2009) entitled, “Quite Strategy Put to the Test,” the author, James Hookway, argues for replicating the small successes of the US troops in the jungles of southern Philippines, but is quick to add that this has been made possible only because a functioning government is in place, willing to cooperate and requiring only some extra help, rather than the bottom-up nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So, it seems that a central point in the current strategy debate revolves around the issue of governance: that an effective and strong Afghan government is a necessary condition for any military strategy to succeed. But what does an effective and strong government entail? Or, better yet, how do we create a strong and effective government in Afghanistan?

In semi-anarchic states like Afghanistan, I think that what is needed is either a form of government where a civilian leader wields military powers, or a form of government where a military leader wields civilian powers. (America’s early colonial administration of the Philippines started with a military governor wielding executive power until a civil governor was put in place.) If neither is feasible, the best thing to hope for is to have a national government in Afghanistan that is “technocratic” in nature, that is, the kind that engages in the practical aspect of governing, results-oriented, professional and uses its power for nation-building on how to provide and facilitate public services, on building community-based institutions, on how to support small businesses and create jobs, etc . A government, in short, that gets things done!

Also, if that leadership understands that the lack of freedom of religion in the country is what causes societal animosities among its people, and, by a stroke of a pen, declares a separation between church and state, thereby guaranteeing freedom of religion to everyone, even assuring the Taliban that they are free to worship however they want but requiring of them to respect others in the way they choose to worship, peace and national reconciliation can be achieved without bloodshed. Am I being unrealistic about this? Yes. Too idealistic? Yes. Sometimes, though, it takes only one enlightened leader to make things happen, there in that realm where reason, justice, and power meet.

Subjecting Afghanistan to elections of competing yet ill-informed political parties does conform to our Western notion of governance. As to the question of whether a government that is formed out of this process will yield good results, the answer is not hard to predict.

Hear! Hear!

A Fair Plan for Honduras: A Lesson from Nicaragua Could Solve This Crisis
by James A. Baker III

Honduras: It’s Time We Get This Right

We should be thankful to Senator Demint (R-SC) and his delegation for paying Honduras’ defacto government a visit (“What I Heard in Honduras,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2009), if only to tell Hondurans that not everyone in Washington DC is crazy and unreasonable. For it seems like it – notwithstanding legal analyses justifying the removal of Manuel Zelaya from office by experts on the Honduran constitution, including legal analysts at the Congressional Research Services, and a reasonable explanation of the limited power of the de facto government by Robert Micheletti (“Moving Forward in Honduras, Washington Post, September 22, 2009), the State Department and the Organization of American States continue to punish Honduras by withholding US aid to its people and by promising not to honor the results of its November presidential elections. The OAS even said that it would not recognize any regime that comes into power after the coup, as that would mean a violation of provisions of the Democratic Charter that uphold the legitimacy of officials that win popular elections.

But a democracy that is grounded on mere procedures is only a procedural kind of democracy, one that is devoid of substance and principles. It does not acknowledge that there are certain standards of government and politics that focus not only on processes and methods but on standards of what is right and just. The nature of a democratic regime is such that it wields power in the interest of its people. A ruler who promotes his own interests goes against the very nature of that regime. The US Declaration of Independence states that when governments become abusive of their powers, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

Why does it seem difficult for the OAS and the State Department to see that sometimes it is necessary to protect democracy against, yes, even “democratically elected presidents” who become abusive of their power! It should take more than a literal interpretation of an organizational charter to determine whether what happened in Honduras was the case of the spirit of the law informing the letter of the law.

That the OAS and the State Department find themselves in agreement with thugs of Latin America -- Chavez and his ilk -- should tell them something. Steady in its course and refusing to be bullied by the bullies of this world, Honduras is offering an important lesson to the entire region on how to be a jealous guardian of democratic principles. It is a fascinating study in democratic revolutions, the rule of law, and the spirit of the law. It's also a study of what is reasonable and decent over thuggery and deceit.

To us students of politics, Honduras is a case in constitutional democratic experimentation that may just prove to be the model that Latin America needs to emulate.

For the US, it offers an occasion for self-examination. We ask Senator DeMint to call for a congressional hearing, question the State Department over its stubborn refusal to change its policy position, and assure Hondurans that we are indeed their friends in constitutional democracy.

Afghanistan Should Also Try and Earn Our Trust

David Ignatius in his Washington Post piece today (Sunday, October 4, 2009) described similarities in the strategy pursued by the Pakistani military during their successful offensive against the Taliban in Swat Valley and the one being laid out by Gen. McChrystal . . . except on matter of trust:

"McChrystal's strategy echoes some of the Pakistani precepts -- more troops, more focus on the population, more security. But even with an additional 40,000 troops, the United States won't have the same popular support the Pakistanis enjoyed in Swat. America is fighting what many Afghans will always regard as a war of occupation. People aren't going to "fall in love" with U.S. troops."

And then he adds:

"The right Afghanistan policy begins with a frank admission that this isn't America's problem, it's Afghanistan's. The United States needs to patiently support the emerging Afghan government, keeping our troop levels firm and reliable, until the Afghans acquire the tools and political consensus to secure their country."

If the population-centric approach of Gen. McChrystal revolves around winning the trust and confidence of the local population, it should work both ways. We have the right to ask whether the people of Afghanistan are deserving of that effort. For if the local population remains tainted (with some of them exhibiting allegiances and loyalties for the enemy), coopting them through this strategy will yield little success. The only way we can trust them is if they prove to us that they are capable of using those tools against the enemy.